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A Strategic Assisted Buyback Scheme of North Korean Debt*
Shi-Yong Lee**1
     This paper considers a strategic assisted buyback scheme that could result in a large benefits 
for both North and South Koreas at a relatively small cost.  We claim that the implementation 
of this scheme by the South could lead to large benefits in the form of foreign capital inflowing 
into North Korea.  Hence, the assisted buyback scheme can be mutually beneficial under a certain 
condition.  The probability of collapse of the current North Korean regime that supports the mutually 
beneficial buyback tends to expand as the North Korea’s benefit-cost from reforms expands.  
Furthermore, as the probability of collapse increases, the probability of reform success increases.  
This indicates that crises may be necessary to induce the North to undertake reforms.
I. Preliminary Remarks
     The future of North Korea is one of the great political uncertainties in the post Cold 
War world.  It is also, naturally, one of the greatest challenges for South Korea, for any 
change taking place in the destitute North Korea would profoundly affect the South.  The 
most serious eventuality is the collapse of the North Korean regime, which could impose 
an enormous burden on the South Korean economy.  Despite calls for the need to prepare 
for this eventuality, the South Korean authority has considered only a few options, thus far 
offering only small amounts of direct aid to the North.
     This paper suggests an alternative aid scheme that could result in large benefits for 
both the North and the South at a relatively small cost, namely an assisted buyback of North 
Korea’s outstanding external debt.1  We provide a descriptive model which specify the precise 
conditions under which an assisted buyback scheme would lead to a mutually beneficial outcome.
     As of 1994, the total amount of the North Korean external debt was about $10 billion 
and reached approximately 50% of its 1994 GNP.2 (Emerging Market Debt Research on North 
Korea (1995))  Since the mid 1980s, North Korea has been unable to service its external 
debt and thus been excluded from the international capital market.  As the historical evidence 
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to Chansik Hong of Sookmyung Women’s University and Sung-Pil Hong of Chung-Ang University for constructive 
comments and encouragements.  Insightful suggestions were also made by the participants in Applied Microeconomics 
Workshop.  Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.
** Department of International Trade, College of Social Sciences, Chung-Ang University.
1. An assisted buyback scheme refers to a practice in which donor (the South) provides funds required for the 
repurchase of a debtor’s (the North) external debt at its current discounted price.  On the other hand, a self-financed 
buyback scheme refers to a devise where a defaulted debtor uses its own resources to repurchase its own debt.  
This paper assumes that North Korea does not have enough funds to engage in a self-financed buyback scheme.
2. Some portion of this subsection draws heavily from Lee (1998a) and Lee and Hong (1998).
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of sovereign debt defaults and lending resumptions demonstrates, nations in default are unable 
to re-borrow from international capital market unless they make settlements with creditors.3  
However, North Korea will be unable to do so any time soon because of the ongoing economic 
crisis and a chronic shortage of foreign reserves.  The North Korean economy has been shrinking 
since 1990 (Lee (1997)), and this trend is unlikely to be reversed unless drastic measures 
are taken.  A natural policy option for the North would be to seek foreign assistance in order 
to rescue itself from the current economic crisis.  The North Korean debt has recently been 
traded at a discounted (average) price of 0.2 to 0.3 dollars to a dollar as Figure 1 indicates.
Figure 1  North Korean Secondary Debt Market Prices
This means that the current total market value of the North Korean debt would be at most 
$3 billion.
     The North Korean debt is classified as “exotic,” (as in case of Vietnam) meaning that 
it is information-elastic and insensitive to economic fundamentals (Emerging Market Debt 
Research on North Korea (1995)).  Any “political” news concerning or affecting the status 
of the current North Korean regime may influence its price substantially.  For example, the 
U.S. decision to lift sanctions against the North or the introduction of a  reform package by 
3. Cole, Dow, and English (1991) reported some stylized features from historical evidence of sovereign debt defaults 
and lending  resumptions.  They observed that even after very long periods of defaults, in one case exceeding 
50 years, countries have had to settle old debts before obtaining new loans.
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the current North Korean regime would affect its discounted price significantly, rather than 
changes in macroeconomic indicators (whose credibility is in serious doubt in any case).
     In the meantime, South Korea must prepare for a potential collapse of the current North 
Korea regime, in which case the South may have to “absorb” the North, or at least assist 
its reconstruction.  In both cases, South Korea would have to incur substantial unification 
cost.  For the purposes of this paper, unification cost is defined as the cost of adjustment 
and restructuring in transforming the centrally planned North into a market-oriented economy.4  
Such a cost would include paying off the defaulted debt of North Korea.  Although this component 
may be trivial compared to the unification cost of as a whole, it is one of the very few options 
available for the South in reducing the unification cost at this point.  But more importantly, 
we claim that the implementation of an assisted buyback scheme by the South could lead 
to large benefits in the form of foreign capital flowing into North Korea.
     The organization of this paper is as follows.  The next section describes the model 
and analyzes the properties of solutions.  It also provides justifications for the underlying 
assumptions in depth.  The final section contains the summary and discussion of future research 
directions.
II. The Model
     This paper presents a simple one-period, two-stage game-theoretic model.  Its focus 
is one the (possible) interaction between two risk-neutral parties (the North and South) under 
an uncertain environment.  Let State 1 indicate the event of unification (the collapse of the 
current North Korean regime) with probability .  State 2 refers to the event of survival 
with probability ( ).  State 2 is sub-divided into the events of reform success with probability 
 and of no reform (status quo) with probability ( ).  Only in the event of reform 
success does North Korea fully repay its debt.
     First, notice that the probability of collapse of the current North Korean regime, , 
is exogenously given.  This reflects the assumption that in the case of North Korea, the stability 
of its regime is determined overwhelmingly by “nature” rather than by its own action.  In 
general, the choice of action taken by the North would affect its survival (or collapse) probability.5  
However, in case of North Korea, we draw two distinct observations.  (1) Many North Korea 
watchers now agree that the dynastic transition of power that took place in 1994 was successful, 
and that the current North Korean regime is stable.6  Internal opposition is virtually non-existent, 
which allows the regime to impose a level of austerity that would not be tolerated in any 
other country.  (2) The actions taken (or not taken) by relevant external parties (surrounding 
superpowers) may significantly affect its survival probability.  Even if the probability of survival 
( ) is an equilibrium outcome chosen by the North Korean regime given the nature (following 
4. So far, most of the literature fails to agree on precise definition of the unification cost.  Hence, the cost of 
unification differs substantially according to various authors.
5. On the other hand, Grossman and Noh (1990) and Grossman (1996) endogenize the probability of survival of 
a political regime.
6. Notice that this is the reason why the events of unification and collapse of the current regime may be treated 
identical.
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Grossman (1996)), we can assume that the regime’s choice may be unaffected by any possible 
action of South Korea.  
     Second, since  is exogenous, it is also unaffected by  which is endogenously determined.  
In fact, the probability of reform success may affect the probability of collapse either positively 
or negatively for a communist regime like North Korea.  At this point, however, its relationship 
between the events collapse and reform success is ambiguous and thus the independence 
assumption is preserved.  However, we can replace the first two assumptions with an alternative 
assumption.  For example, both  and  can be endogenized such that the result of reform 
success/failure can affect the probability of survival.  This alternative setup has been dealt 
in Lee and Hong (1998).
     Following from the precedence of international law and the recent experience of German 
unification, we also assume that in the event of unification (collapse of the current North 
Korean regime), South Korea must fully repay North’s external debt.  Assuming an efficient 
secondary debt market, the secondary price of the North Korean debt is then   
Actions taken by the North and South can influence the average price of North Korean debt; 
South Korea can engage in an assisted buyback scheme and North Korea can take costly 
actions for reform success.7
     The sequence of events is described as follows:
1. Prior to the realization of the status of the current North Korean regime, South Korea 
decides whether to engage in an assisted buyback scheme or not.
2. After the action taken by the South, North Korea chooses an adjustment effort level for 
reform before the realization of its status.
 
     Before we develop a model, North Korean reforms deserve some comment.  First, we 
define reform as programs that North Korea adopts in order to transform itself from a centrally 
planned to a market-oriented economy.  These programs may include privatization, introduction 
of bankruptcy laws, removal of price rationing, liberalization of international trade to any other 
restructuring policies.  It is important to note that North Korean reforms are assumed to be 
irreversible.  Once “investments” in reforms are made in such programs, it is difficult to reverse 
he course.  According to our definition, reforms refer to the introduction of liberalization policies 
into a society where two generations of extreme control and dynastic ideology prevail.  Once 
the current regime commits to reform policies,  it would find it difficult to receive them, 
despite some frictions along the way.8  Another reason for the irreversible nature of such 
reform program is the external influences.  Once the current regime undertakes reforms, foreign 
assistance and its coordination with foreign nations may play important roles in determining 
the success of reforms.  Liberalization may risk its own survival.
With respect to the above point, we justify our one-period two-stages setup.  Some may 
7. In the stark contrast to Bulow and Rogoff (1988), Cohen (1991) reported that a change in the amounts of debt 
does not change discounted (secondary) prices of debt.  However, in our setup, the discounted price of the North 
Korean debt may be increased with reform success.  As it will be specified below, an assisted buyback scheme 
by the South may start the North’s reform and thus increase its discounted price substantially.
8. Even Russia does not reverse its course in spite of strong oppositions.
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object this setup since it may suffer from the time-inconsistency problem.  However, the repayment 
is not the issue of the this paper as in Bulow and Rogoff (1988).  Instead, the issue of this 
paper is to determine the condition that the North Korean regime undertakes reforms if South 
Korea provides an assisted buyback to the North.
In order to derive a solution, we solve backward, and, hence, start with the analysis 
of North Korea.
1. North Korea
     This subsection describes the North Korea’s choice by introducing the probability of 
reform success.  Many factors may affect the probability of reform success but we propose 
that the probability of reform success depends on adjustment effort of the current North Korean 
regime and the level of assisted buyback.  Dornbusch (1990) claimed that the arrival of aid 
may be the occasion of reform since it creates a sufficient probability of reform success.  
Similarly, an assisted buyback may substitute for costly adjustment reform effort that the North 
can take.  Furthermore, the settlement of the defaulted debt with the existing creditors is the 
precondition for foreign capital inflow. (Cole, Dow, and English (1991)) An assisted buyback 
scheme acts as the settlement, and in return, it may induce foreign capital inflow and help 
the North to start reforms.  In order to derive an explicit solution, we adopt the following 
functional form for the probability of reform success:
                                                    (1)
where  represents the North’s adjustment effort for reform and  indicates the level of 
assisted buyback by the South.  Notice that two choice variables ( ) are normalized such 
that they are expressed in terms of debt overhang.
     At this point, we explore an interesting possibility: what if the current North Korean 
regime may not be interested in reforms regardless of the provision of foreign aid?  In contrast 
to Dornbusch (1990), Becker and Becker (1997) pointed out that economic aid tends to postpone 
rather than to contribute to reforms.  This depends largely upon the type of aid package.  
For example, the food aid provided by the South may not contribute to increase the probability 
of reform success.  Noland (1997) predicted that the current regime may not undertake any 
significant reform (before some rapprochement with South Korea) even though it has recently 
begun “some modest and hesitant reforms.”  An assisted buyback scheme, however, reduces 
fully or partially North Korea’s indebtedness, and allows resumption of new loans.  This creates 
an opportunity for potential investors to reinvest in the North.  Then foreign capital may flow 
in.  With this scheme, the benefits from reforms may outweigh the costs, and it helps the 
North to start off reforms.  Due to this capital inflow, the probability of reform success improves 
substantially.  As aforementioned argument goes, the purpose of this aid scheme is to remove 
barriers to capital mobility.9  
9. When the North invited potential investors to a newly established special economic zone, one of the main reasons 
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Adjustment effort for reform success must be costly to the current North Korean regime.  
For instance, the adjustment cost of reforms, generally speaking, can be high if the society 
that undertakes reforms is highly polarized.  Here, the adjustment cost to the regime (of undertaking 
reforms) may arise due to the divergence between the old and new system.  In other words, 
due to the dynastic and homogeneity tradition that have prevailed in the North, it is costly 
for the current regime to convince and mobilize its party (and power elites) to adopt the 
market-oriented economic system.  Taking account of the nature of the current regime, we 
can easily figure out that the introduction of the new system (a market-oriented economic 
system) imposes some constraints on the current regime.  The cost function for adjustment 
effort is simple , where  is a positive constant.   indicates the North’s marginal 
cost of adjustment effort.
North Korea’s problem is to select .  In solving this problem, the North takes  as given.  
Hence, the North maximizes the following expected payoff function, Equation (2) with respect 
to :
                                      (2)
 indicates North Korea’s expected payoff from reform.  Denote  as the current 
North Korean regime’s benefits from reform success and , the benefits from status quo.  
Let  be  and assume that it is a non-negative number and 10
The solution to North Korea’s problem is, 
                       (3)
     Let  be  and indicates a cut-off point.  From now on, for the sake of 
notational simplicity, let .  For instance, if we let the ratio of net benefit to cost 
of reform for the current North Korean regime (benefit-cost ratio, hereafter), , equal to 1, 
then the solution becomes
                        (3)'
     Notice that if , then the current debt overhang is too large for the North to undertake 
reform.  This highlights the fact that the foreign aid is essential for the North to start reform.  
Alternatively, if the South wipes out North Korea’s external debt ( ), the North again 
does not supply any effort.  To conceptualize this point more thoroughly, we present the 
North’s reaction curves when  is equal to 1 or (1/2) in Figure 2.
that they were reluctant to invest was the unsettlement of the existing defaulted debt.
10. That is, the relative benefits of reform to status quo are not too high for the current regime.
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Figure 2  North Korea’s Reaction Curves for Various Benefit-Cost Ratios
2. South Korea
     This subsection analyzes the choice of South Korea, In choosing , the South takes 
into account how this choice will affect the North’s adjustment effort level.  Put differently, 
the South acts as a Stackelberg Leader.
     The expected payoff for the risk-neutral South is,
                 (4)
 is the discounted price of North Korean debt and equals to .   is the endowment 
of the South.11  represents the unification cost function.
     The features of unification cost function deserve some comments.  It exhibits the subsequent 
properties: , , with  and .   We adopt the 
following functional form that satisfies the above properties:
                                                      (5)
11. Again, all the variables here are expressed in terms of debt overhang of the North.
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 refers to the fixed component of unification cost.
     First, we examine Equation (5).  As indicated in the previous section, the unification 
cost generally refers to the cost of adjustment and restructuring to transform the North into 
a market-oriented economy.  Hence, the South is likely to suffer from a higher unification 
cost as the benefit-cost ratio of the North falls.  According to Equation (5), the reduction 
of North Korea’s current debt overhang leads to a fall in the unification cost.  As a result, 
this provides an incentive for the South to reduce the debt overhang of the North even before 
the collapse of the North.
     Second, if the South does not intervene, then the average price of North Korean debt 
remains at  since there exists no possibility of reform.12  As soon as it intervenes via an 
assisted buyback scheme, it jumps to   Notice that this rise is due to 
a positive probability of reform success.  As long as  is relatively low, the jump would 
be higher.  As the intervention by the South makes the current North Korean regime to 
undertake reforms and the probability of collapse is relatively lower, the secondary market 
price jumps higher.  More importantly, this move may attract foreign capital inflow into the 
North.  This effect acts like a signalling.  As the South provides more aid to the North, 
this signalling effect tends to be stronger.  Notice that the essence of the unification cost 
lies on the considerable rise in demand for funds.13  In this case, foreign capital inflow may 
substitute for the substantial demand for funds (Norland (1997)).  In return, the Sou th’s 
intervention via an assisted buyback scheme may reduce the unification cost significantly.  
These features are captured in Equation (5).
     The South has to take into account how the choice of a level of assisted buyback will 
affect the North’s reaction.  Hence,
                                                    (6)
     The first order condition to Equation (4) with the substitution of Equations (5) and (6) 
is as follow:14
                                        (7)
Notice that its second order condition (SOC, hereafter) holds for  That is, 
if the benefit-cost ratio is equal to or larger than 9, then its SOC does not hold for the feasible 
range of  This implies that if the returns from reform is substantially huge for the current 
North Korean regime, then the North can provide enough effort for itself and an optimal 
12. Notice that v cannot be greater than 1.  Since q cannot be negative, the secondary market price follows as 
the main text describes.
13. This substantial increase in demand for funds may be due to the need for reconstruction of the North Korean 
economy.
14. Apart from Equation (7), another solution exists for the feasible range of  However, this solution fails to 
satisfies its SOC and omitted from the analysis. 
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level of the assisted buyback does not exist for the South. If the benefit-cost ratio is 1, then 
its SOC holds for .
     The variations of the benefit-cost ratio generates level effects. See Figure 3 below. For 
example, if we assume that , then the optimal level of assisted buyback is about 
.27 even when the probability of unification is close to 0.
 
Figure 3  Optimal Assisted Buyback Levels with Various Benefit-cost Ratios
     We now provide the solution for the optimal assisted buyback for the South 
                                     (8)
where  is  Notice that p has to be less than  to avoid an imaginary 
solution. If it turns out to be an imaginary solution, then the optimal assisted buyback for 
the South is 0. 
     For the benchmark case, we compute  when  Then the solution for  becomes, 
                                    (8)'
In this case,  is expressed in the probability of unification, , alone. From Equation (8)', 
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recognize that  cannot take a value between ((4/7),1). Note that if  is equal to 1, then 
the optimal assisted buyback for the South, , is 0 for (4/7, 1). This is based on a 
simple idea. The essence lies on the quadratic form of the South’s utility function in  and 
the independence of  from  To see this point, we examine Equation (4) when =1. 
As  becomes high, the effectiveness of a positive optimal level of assisted buyback is reduced 
since the weight assigned to the reform success falls.  Therefore, for sufficiently high  
the optimal level of assisted buyback is 0. 
     We provide the solutions for  and . 
                                             (9)
                                            (10)
     With Equations (8), (9), and (10), this setup relates the exogenous probability of unification, 
 and the benefit-cost ratio, , to the probability of reform success,  The following Corollary 
summarizes the relationship between the two parameters to the probability of reform success. 
Corollary 1A :  An exogenous increase in the probability of unification (collapse of the current  
             regime) within the feasible range leads to an increase in the equilibrium  
             probability  of reform success.
Corollary 1B : If the probability of collapse lies within the feasible range, an exogenous  
              increase in the benefit-cost ratio, , leads to a rise in the equilibrium probability  
              of reform success.
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that the optimal assisted buyback is increasing and convex in  for the feasible range. 
Then a marginal increase in the probability of unification (collapse of current regime) along 
this line induces the South to finance the buyback more. From Equation (10), this, in return, 
leads to an increase in the reform success. Drazen and Grilli (1990) provided the similar intuition 
in a different setup. They claimed that economic reforms are likely to succeed when an economy 
suffers from a crisis. They used a war of attrition model to derive this result. In their paper, 
crises may be necessary to induce structural change because economic participants believe 
that someone else can be forced to bear the burden. In normal periods, such structural changes 
are resisted, however, the periods of crises facilitate the introduction of economic reforms. 
Therefore, two different models imply similar results.  
     Looking more closely at Corollary 1B, an increase in the benefit-cost ratio may affect 
the probability of reform success via two channels.  As a rise in the benefit-cost ratio from 
reforms implies that the returns from the reforms for the current North Korean regime increase.  
This effect may increase its equilibrium probability of reform success.  However, an increase 
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in  induces the South to provide “less aid” to the North, and this effect lowers the probability 
of reform success.  Therefore, two conflicting effects interact as  increase.  But the former 
effect outweighs the latter, and this leads to an increase in the probability of reform success.  
At this point, it is difficult to predict the benefit-cost ratio for the current North Korean regime.  
However, in order to acquire more “aid” from the South, the current regime needs to hide 
its true benefit-cost ratio and pretend that it is low.
     The subsequent Proposition specifies the optimal assisted buyback range for the South.
Proposition: A mutually beneficial assisted buyback scheme always exists iff  falls within  
           the following range:  As  increases, the  
           probability of collapse that sustains the mutually beneficial range expands. 
Proof: See Appendix.
First, the right hand side (RHS) of the above inequality must be non-negative since we assume 
that v is less than or equal to 1. Then, RHS refers to the lower bound:  has to be greater 
than this number to sustain a mutually beneficial assisted buyback. Moreover, the left hand 
side (LHS) implies the upper bound:  has to be less than this number in order to avoid 
an imaginary solution that may leads to no assisted buyback. It is important to realize that 
the probability distribution of collapse that may leads to a mutually beneficial buyback range 
expands as  increases. To see this point, if , then  only has to be less than (4/7) 
for the existence of a mutually beneficial assisted buyback. (The only restriction is the upper 
bound.) Moreover, since the RHS approaches (1/2) as  approaches 0. This implies that as 
 approaches 0, the mutually beneficial range becomes extremely slim. The results described 
above are presented in Table below.  
Table 1  Mutually Beneficial Assisted Buyback Range of  and 
mutually beneficial range of 
1 0 < p < .57 
(3/4) .2 < p < .55 
(1/2) .33 < p < .54  
(1/4) .42 < p < .52 
(1/6)  .45 < p < .51
 
     The incentive for the South to engage in an assisted buyback scheme is to reduce the 
unification cost. In order to reduce the unification cost, the South can engage in the assisted 
buyback scheme. It can reduce the North Korean external debt burden and the general unification 
cost in the event of collapse. The North’s payoff is unambiguously better off due to the South’s 
assisted buyback scheme as it provides sufficient incentive for the North to undertake reforms 
in the event of survival. 
     If the benefit-cost ratio of the current regime is high (close to 1), then the probability 
distribution of collapse that supports the mutually beneficial assisted buyback expands. Given 
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 the South has to provide less aid to the North if  is relatively low. As the reform 
may generate large returns to the current regime, this implies that the South may not necessarily 
provide large aid to the North. Even if  is low, the large benefit-cost ratio provides enough 
incentive to support the mutually beneficial assisted buyback.
     To provide the median case, notice that if (1/2), then the mutually beneficial range 
falls between (1/3) and (7/13). This implies that  cannot be too low to sustain a mutually 
beneficial assisted buyback. Suppose that  is less than (1/3). Then the weights attached 
to the event of unification is relatively low. Then  has to be relatively high to support 
a mutually beneficial buyback. However, the benefit-cost ratio is not high enough and, as 
a result, the South has to provide large aid which may be too costly. Hence, it is not effective 
for the South to provide an assisted buyback in this case. 
     On the other hand, if  is low, then  has to be sufficiently high to generate such 
mutually beneficial assisted buyback scheme. If  becomes an extremely low number,  
has to be sufficiently large for the existence of the mutually beneficial buyback. However, 
it can be too costly for the South to finance such a scheme. 
III.  Concluding Remarks
     Instead of restating the main results derived from this paper, we explore a direction 
of future research. We can examine whether preplay communication between the North and 
South can arise or not. The investigation of this possibility has policy relevance since this 
model can specify the condition of cooperation between the two seemingly hostile parties. 
The previous subsection demonstrates that an assisted buyback scheme can be mutually beneficial 
to both parties (North and South) if the probability of collapse is within a certain range. If 
this is the case, then it seems reasonable that preplay communication between the two parties 
can arise before they take any action. A cheap talk model asserts that when preferences are 
similar, preplay communication between two parties may be possible and beneficial. Notice 
that since the North has an incentive to undertake reforms and the South has interests in 
provision of aid, this setting is suitable for a cheap talk. This is the subject of Lee (1998b). 
There, the existing model generalize the aid scheme, and, moreover, the aid provided by the 
South directly affects the probability of survival of the North Korean regime.  
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Appendix
1. Proof of Corollary 1A:
From Equation (8), we can show that the optimal assisted buyback level for the South is 
increasing in  Hence,
     
From Equation (10), it is easy to obtain the following:
     
Notice that the sign of the above derivative is non-negative for (0,1). It can be easily shown 
that  is also increasing in  This completes the proof of Corollary 1A.
2. Proof of Corollary 1B:
To obtain the proof of Corollary 1B, the sign of the following derivative has to be determined. 
From Equation (10), 
     
In order to obtain the sign of the above derivative, the following derivatives have to be computed:
     
     
Notice that  for the feasible range of  from Equation (8). With further simplification, 
the substitution of the above two equations into the first boils down to the following inequality:
     
Substituting Equation (8) into , this inequality leads to the subsequent inequality:
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The sign of the above inequality is unambiguously positive. This completes the proof of 
Corollary 1B.
3. Proof of Proposition:
With a positive level of optimal assisted buyback, the South’s payoff is 
     
Then the South has to compare it with the alternative payoff (no intervention) which is,
 
     
The comparison between two strategies leads the following inequality:
     
where  is obtained in Equation (8). The substitution of Equation (8) into the above inequality 
leads to the following:
     
The above inequality can be simplified as below:
     
The above inequality can be further simplified by using :
     
The above inequality can be easily transformed into the expression of . Then utilizing the 
feasible range { } in the main text, we can obtain the same expression in 
Proposition. This completes the proof of Proposition. 
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